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Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information 
 
 
 
Abstract 
  
We consider optimal trade policy for a large country with private information. We show that the 
optimal tariff leads to a signaling equilibrium with higher tariffs and lower welfare than under 
complete information, whereas the optimal import quota replicates the complete information 
equilibrium and thus is superior to the tariff.  We also show that, with the tariff, the country may 
be better off being uninformed.  Finally, we show that if the importing nation cannot commit to 
its tariff, the use of futures contracts together with the dynamically consistent tariff leads to the 
same equilibrium as under complete information with commitment.  
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Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information 
 
I. Introduction 
 One of the most prolific literatures in international economics concerns the relationship 
between tariffs and quotas1.  As the literature shows, while the two tools can be equivalent in a 
deterministic, competitive setting, there are a number of scenarios under which they differ.  One 
such circumstance is when firms possess market power, since the residual demand (or supply) 
curve firms face differs under the two instruments.  Another case in which the two tools differ is 
in the presence of uncertainty.  If the policy-maker faces uncertainty when she sets the policy 
tool, and if the tool cannot be made contingent upon the random variable, then the two policies 
give rise to different probability distributions of outcomes.  While a normative comparison of the 
two tools cannot be made without specifying the economic model and the reason that 
commercial policy is being used, the general consensus is probably that tariffs are superior to 
quotas.  The superiority of tariffs, in most cases, arises because price and quantity decisions can 
respond to the realization of the random variable more fully under a tariff than under a quota.    
 What has not been widely discussed is the fact that the level of the policy tool may be 
influenced by private information.  For example, consider a government that can impose import 
restrictions on a good (e.g., oil), and assume the optimal level of these restrictions depends upon 
government reserves.  Assume that under full information the optimal tariff decreases (or the 
import quota decreases) as oil reserves increase. If all parties know the oil reserves, the 
government can set the policy tool without considering how it affects expectations concerning 
reserves, and thus the two policy instruments will be equivalent (assuming all the usual caveats 
apply).  However, if oil reserves are private information, exporters may use the level of the tariff 
or quota to make inferences concerning these reserves.  In this case, the importing government, 
when setting the tariff (or quota), will take into account not only the objective being pursued in 
using this instrument, but also the impact of the level of the instrument on exporter’s beliefs.   
 Thus, either the tariff or the quota may serve as a signal about the level of reserves (also 
called the type) of the importing country.  However, the impact on  exporting nations of the 
actual type of the importing country will differ under the two policy regimes and thus the two 
policy tools will give rise to different equilibria.  With the increased role of governments in 
                                                          
1 The comparison of price-based tools and quantity-based tools is certainly not restricted to the international 
economics literature.  One of the more contemporary areas where this comparison is also germane is in the 
environmental literature where taxes and command and control regulations are compared. 
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modern economies, and especially with the growing importance of Communist, or formerly 
Communist countries (e.g., China and Russia) in the world trading system, it should be apparent 
that this discussion is more than academic.  It is clear that some governments, at the same time 
they are either setting trade policy or entering into direct agreements with foreign buyers or 
suppliers, also have private information which would be relevant in forecasting price (and other 
aggregates).  One need look no further than commodity markets to see that announcements of 
past purchases (or lack of purchases) by foreign countries can affect prices.  Furthermore, even 
in the case of a market-oriented country like Canada, the Wheat Board may simultaneously 
possess government powers for affecting trade plus private information (such as wheat stocks).  
Moreover, the strong push toward tariffication in recent GATT (and WTO) negotiations is 
largely predicated upon the belief that the impact of tariffs is more transparent than that of 
quotas.  Thus, it would seem important to compare the informational implications of each tool.  
 Collie and Hviid (1994) is one of the first attempts to analyze the signaling role of tariffs. 
They use a partial equilibrium model in which a nation imports from a monopolist supplier, and 
the domestic government uses import tariffs to recapture some of the monopoly rents.  However, 
since the government possesses private information about domestic demand, the tariff may signal 
the type of consumer to the foreign monopolist.  As a result of this signaling effect, the tariff will 
be higher and the country will be worse off than under complete information.  Note that in their 
model the tariff is not the first best instrument under complete information.  
 In this paper we continue the analysis of the signaling role of different trade policy 
instruments. Since any normative comparison of policy instruments must provide a rationale for 
the use of policy, we work within the context of a large country that uses the tariff, or quota, to 
improve its terms of trade and domestic welfare.  The basic model is the standard two good 
international trade model, where one large country (US) uses trade policy to improve welfare, 
whereas all other countries (ROW) pursue free trade. The specific model we use is simplified 
enough to be tractable, yet rich enough to demonstrate equivalence of tariffs and quotas under 
full information, and the inferiority of quotas to tariffs under uncertainty.   Similarly to Collie 
and Hviid (1994), we show that the tariff in the signaling equilibrium of the asymmetric 
information game exceeds that under full information and that both exporting and importing 
nations are worse off than under complete information.  We also show that if the policy-active 
government uses a quota the resulting outcome is the same as under full information. Thus, 
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quotas are superior to tariffs in an environment where the policy-active government has private 
information. However, it is well known that quotas have been largely abolished under GATT 
agreements. For this reason, in addition to comparing tariffs and quotas we consider other 
instruments that may be employed by the policy-active government to signal reserves.  
If the policy-active government can postpone commitment to a tariff rate it may have an 
incentive to wait until after the foreign producers have made their production decisions. Under 
asymmetric information, when the government in the importing country sets its final tariff after 
production decisions, the welfare in the importing country may improve compared to a situation 
when the tariff is set before the production decisions, but the welfare must be lower than in the 
situation of commitment under full information. Obviously, if the importing nation could make 
its private information public and could precommit to a tariff rate before production decisions are 
made, then the outcome would mimic the equilibrium under full information. However, since it 
is very unlikely that the private information is hard (that is, its revelation cannot be manipulated) 
this outcome is not feasible. Under these circumstances the following question is important: 
When the information is asymmetric and when quotas cannot be used, is there a policy 
instrument that can restore the importing nation’s welfare to the level it has under full 
information? It turns out that if the importing nation can sell forward contracts and can set its 
tariff after production decisions are made, then the answer to this question is positive. Welfare in 
both the exporting and the importing nations improves as a result of the ability to sell forward.  
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  In the next section we briefly describe the 
model and the sequence in which decisions are made.  We also solve for the full information 
equilibrium, assuming the US uses commercial policy to maximize domestic welfare.  In section 
3 we assume that there is uncertainty concerning US reserves of the import good, that the 
distribution of reserves is common knowledge, and that the US must choose its policy instrument 
before anybody learns reserves.  In this setting we replicate the standard conclusion that tariffs 
dominate quotas under uncertainty.  In section 4, we assume that the US government learns its 
level of reserves before setting policy, but that other countries – when making production 
decisions – know only the prior distribution of reserves and the actual tariff (or quota) chosen by 
the importing country.  The results in this section concerning the tariff parallel those in Collie 
and Hviid (1994), but we also show that the quota is superior to the tariff. In section 5, we 
consider the same asymmetric information setting but allow the domestic government to engage 
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in forward transactions. As with the tariff (and quota), the amount purchased forward serves as a 
signal to producers in exporting countries. The ability to purchase forward allows the importing 
country to achieve the same welfare as in the case when producers in the exporting countries are 
completely informed about the level of reserves. We conclude with a discussion concerning the 
implications of the paper and possible extensions.   
 
2. The Model 
We use the simplest general equilibrium model capable of clarifying the roles tariffs or 
quotas may play as signaling devices. We assume there are two goods, the numeraire good, x, 
and a second good, y.  Furthermore, we assume there is one policy-active large country (the 
U.S.) that imports good y and exports good x.  There is a collection of small identical countries 
that pursue free trade, and these can be aggregated into a single country (ROW).  Agents within 
each country have identical quasi-linear preferences given by: 
 
(1) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )2 22 ; 2x y y x y yU c Ac c U c Ac cγ γ β= + − = + − β ,   
 
where , ( ),x yc c ( ,x yc c )denote the consumption vectors in the US and ROW, respectively (the  
“bar” over the variable denotes the ROW).  Let ( ),0xe  and ( ),0xe  denote the endowment vector 
of a private agent in the US and ROW, respectively.    In addition to private endowments, we 
assume that the US government has endowments (reserves) of good y, and we denote these (on a 
per capita basis) by R.  Thus, aggregate per capita endowments in the US are . As we 
discuss later, producers in the exporting countries may not know the value of R in the initial 
stages of the game.  Finally, we assume that no production takes place in the US but that in 
ROW good y can be produced using inputs of the numeraire2: 
( ,xe R)
 
(2) ( )2 2 0y xq δ − ≤A , 
 
                                                          
2 Assuming no production occurs in the US is a simplifying assumption.  The main issue that arises if there were  US 
production is, when the US government has private information not available to ROW, what is the information set of 
US producers?  The structure used here makes US agents completely passive and bypasses that issue. 
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where ,yq Ax  denotes output of good y and input of good x, respectively, in ROW.  Finally, for 
simplicity, we normalize the number of agents in each country to one. 
 The demands and indirect utility function for the preferences given in (1) are: 
 
(3) ( )( ) ( )( )2 2* * * *; 2 ; ;y y y y y yc A p V I A p c A p V I A p 2γ γ γ β β= − = + − = − = + − β  
 
where ( , )I I  denote income in each country3.   Foreign income consists of the value of 
endowments plus the net profits from production, whereas domestic per capita income consists 
of the value of endowments plus tariff (or quota) revenue: 
 
(4) ( ) ( ); ;x y y y y y yI e p R p p m m c R= + + − = − ( )2 2x y y yI e p q q δ = + −   . 
 
In (4), m  denotes US imports of good y, and hence y ( )y y yp p m−  is the tariff revenue.   
 The case of full information serves as a useful benchmark. For this reason, we start with 
the scenario where the sequence of decisions is the following. In the initial stage, the value of US 
reserves R is learned by all agents. In the following stage, the US government irrevocably sets its 
trade policy. Foreign producers make production decisions after observing the level of the US 
trade policy instrument. Finally, trade and consumption decisions are made and implemented. 
 Throughout, we assume production decisions are made before consumption decisions. 
We also assume for now that the government can commit to its trade policy, so that no time 
consistency issues arise.  The more important point concerns when the value of R is discovered 
and by whom.  In this section we assume the value of R is known to all agents at the beginning of 
the game, so there is no uncertainty and no signaling content in trade policy.  In the next section 
we consider uncertainty, in which the true value of R is unknown to all at the beginning, and is 
discovered simultaneously after trade policy and production decisions are made.  In sections 4 
and 5, where we discuss signaling issues, R will be learned by the government at stage 1, but will 
not be revealed to other agents until after production decisions are made.  
 Since information is complete, when foreign producers make production decisions they 
can perfectly forecast price and, hence, their supply rule and foreign income are given by: 
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 (5)  ( )* 2; 2y y x yq p I e pδ δ= = + . 
 
Using (3), the import demand and export supply equations can be written as: 
 
(6) ( ) ( );y y ys p A m A R ypδ β γ= + − = − −  
 
Closing the model requires specifying the level of the trade policy instrument (tariff or quota).  
As is well-known, the two instruments are identical in this case.  Letting t denote the specific 
tariff, so that y yp t p= + , equilibrium prices, and trade flows are: 
 
(7) ;y y
A A R t A A R tp pγ σγ σ γ σ
+ − − + − += =+ + ; 
( ) ( )
y
A R A t
s
σ γ σ
γ σ
− − += + , 
 
where σ δ β≡ + . We assume ( ){ } 0A R Aσ γ− − ≥  for all possible values of R.  Substituting (7) 
back into equation (3), using (4)-(7), gives indirect utility for the US in terms of the tariff: 
 
(8) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 22( ) 1 ,
2 2x
R A A RM R t
V t e M t
γφ φφγ γ σ
+ −+ −= + + + − −+      
 
where ( ) ( ) ( )1  and M A R A
σφ φ φ γ σ≡ − − − ≡ + . 
The US government chooses tariff t to maximize the indirect utility function V t . Thus, the 
optimal tariff, equilibrium prices, imports  and welfare are given by: 
( )
 
(9) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* *
2 2
*
( ) 0; ; ;
2 2 2
2 1
;
2 2 2
y y
y x
A R AM Mt R m R p R
R A A RA R A M R M
p R V R e
φ
γ σ φ φ φ φ φ γ σ
φ
2φ γ σ γ γ σ γ σ φ φ
− += > = =+ − − − +
+ −− + + −= = + + +− + + + −
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3 We focus on interior solutions and assume the level of income is sufficient to guarantee both goods are consumed.  
In the US all government revenue, both from endowments (R) and from trade restrictions, is rebated to consumers. 
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 Note that the solution possesses the following properties: (i)the optimal specific tariff is a 
monotonically decreasing function of government reserves R; (ii)optimal imports (exports) – and 
hence the optimal quota – are also a decreasing function of government reserves; and (iii)the 
world and domestic price are monotonically decreasing functions of government reserves.  Also, 
the equilibrium does not depend on whether an import tariff or import quota is used.   
 Before considering the signaling role of trade policy, we briefly review what happens if 
uncertainty is present when government trade policy and foreign production decisions are made. 
 
3. The Optimal Tariff and Quota under Uncertainty 
In this section we modify the information structure and sequence of actions as follows:  
 
Stage 1: The US government irrevocably sets trade policy, given the common knowledge 
concerning the distribution of reserves; 
Stage 2: Foreign producers make production decisions; 
Stage 3: The true value of reserves is revealed to all parties; 
Stage 4: Trade and consumption decisions are made and implemented. 
We assume R is distributed on the interval ,R R ⊂R   .  The non-equivalence of tariffs 
and quotas with this information structure is well-known.  The sole purpose of this section is to 
motivate the next section.  
 We simultaneously consider both the tariff and the quota equilibria. Denote the specific 
tariff by t and the quota by L.  Given the levels of the trade instrument, foreign production and 
reserves, equilibrium world and domestic prices and imports for each case are given by: 
 
(10) ( ) ( ) ( ); , ;yq qy yL A q A L R qyp L p L R mβ γ
+ − − −= = L L≡  
(11) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), ; , ; , yyt t t ty y y y
A R A q tA A R q t
p t R p t R p t m t R
β γ βγ
γ β γ β
− − − ++ − − −= = + =+ +  
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where the superscript “q” in (10) refers to the case of a quota whereas the superscript “t” in (11) 
refers to the case of a specific tariff4.  Note that world prices do not depend on realized reserves 
under the quota; thus, foreign producers do not need to know the distribution of reserves (or their 
true value) to forecast world price.  Under the tariff, world prices depend on realized reserves 
and the tariff, and thus foreign output depends on beliefs concerning the distribution of R.  In this 
section, since trade policy is chosen before R is known, the tariff does not modify the producers’ 
beliefs, but in the next section this will no longer be the case. 
 Due to risk-neutrality and the model’s quadratic structure, output depends on expected 
prices: * eyq ypδ= , where eyp  is the expected price conditional on information available when 
production decisions are made.  For a quota, there is no uncertainty as expected and realized 
world prices are the same; in the case of a tariff, due to the linear structure of the price forecast, 
the expected price depends only upon expected reserves.  Thus, solving for each case we have: 
 
(12) 
( ) ( ) ( ); ; ,q q qy y yL A L A A L Rq p p L Rδ σ σ γ
+ + − −= = = ;  
(13) ( ) ( ); ; ;
e
e t e t e t e
y y y y y y y
A A R tp q p p p p p tγ εδ ,εγ σ γ β
+ − −= = = − = + −+ + γ β+  
 
where ( )eR E R≡  and ( )eR Rε ≡ − .   
 For each case, the optimal tariff (or quota) is found by substituting the equilibrium price 
relations and import revenue back into the indirect utility function and maximizing expected 
utility over the policy instrument.  Since the first order conditions are linear, the solution for each 
case depends only upon the expected value of reserves, and certainty equivalence holds for the 
policy instruments (i.e., expected imports under the optimal tariff equal the optimal quota, and 
the expected tariff-equivalent under the optimal quota equals the optimal tariff). Let 
( ) ( )q q q
y y
A L R L A
t p p
σ γ
γσ
− − − +≡ − =  denote the tariff-equivalent under the quota. Performing 
the optimization yields the following: 
   
                                                          
4 It is well-known that ad valorem and specific tariffs are not equivalent under uncertainty.   We consider only the 
specific tariff and quota cases. 
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(14) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * *; ;2 2
ee
q e q
R RVar RML E V V R t R tφ γ
−= = − = −− ;γ       
(15) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( )* * 2
2
; ;
2 2
ee
t e t
y
*
R RVar RMt E V V R m R L
βγ β
γ σ φ φ γ βγ β
−+= = − = −+ − ++ ;    
 
where ( ) ( )1e eM A R Aφ φ≡ − − −  , ( )* eV R  denotes maximized US utility when eR R≡  (from 
equation (9)) and Var  is the variance of R.  As is well-known, the tariff yields strictly  higher 
expected utility .  Although not shown here, it is clear that the exporting countries are 
also better off in the case of the tariff than the quota due to the (strict) convexity of the indirect 
utility function in (export) price. The conclusion follows since expected price is the same under 
the two regimes, but export price is deterministic under the quota, but stochastic under the tariff.  
( )R
( )0β >
 
4. Tariffs and Quotas as Signaling Devices 
We now consider the signaling role of tariffs and quotas under asymmetric information.  
In particular, the information structure and the timing of decisions are as follows: 
 
Stage 1: The value of R is learned by the government but is not revealed to foreign agents5. 
Stage 2: The US government irrevocably sets trade policy (tariff or quota). 
Stage 3: Foreign producers make production decisions based upon their prior beliefs concerning 
R and the observed level of the trade policy instrument. 
Stage 4: The true value of R is revealed to all agents. 
Stage 5: Trade and consumption decisions are made and implemented. 
 
 This decision structure differs from the case of uncertainty as the government learns its 
true reserves before setting policy, and it differs from the full information case as foreign 
producers do not learn the true value of R until after production decisions are made.  It is these 
differences that result in the US government’s trade policy being a potential signal of reserves. 
 Consider first the optimal quota.  As previously noted, under a quota foreign prices 
depend only upon the quota level and not upon the true level of reserves.  Thus, it is irrelevant to 
                                                          
5 Since US private agents are completely passive in the model it is immaterial when they learn the true value of R.   
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foreign producers whether the quota accurately reveals true reserves.  Even if the quota fully 
reveals the level of reserves, the equilibrium is unaffected by the fact the quota serves as a signal.   
 Since foreign production under the quota does not depend on US reserves, the US 
government has no incentive to misrepresent its type.  Thus, the equilibrium under the quota is 
exactly the same as when both parties are initially informed about the true level of reserves.  This 
equilibrium is given by (9), with the optimal quota given by: ( ) ( )( )* 2L R M φ= − .  
 Next, consider the incentive structure under the tariff6. The US government sets a tariff 
 that may be a function of its private information R. After observing the tariff, foreign 
producers make an inference about the true level of US reserves. We let r(t) denote the updated 
beliefs of foreign producers about US reserves. If foreign producers can perfectly infer the level 
of reserves R, then we will say that the equilibrium is separating.  
( )t R
Under a tariff, realized foreign price depends on the tariff, the level of foreign production, 
and the true value of reserves.  Thus, actual reserves (potentially) affect foreign production 
decisions in two ways – through the tariff, which is known when production decisions are made, 
and through the realized price – which is not known, but may be inferred from the tariff. 
 We solve backward to determine the equilibrium. Given production levels, the tariff and 
the realized value of reserves, foreign prices are given by equation (11).  When foreign producers 
make their output decision they use their forecast of the future foreign price  
 
(16) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }( )y y yq E p t A A r t q tδ δ γ= = + − − − +γ β      
  
where ( yE p t )  is the expected foreign price conditional on the announced tariff rate. Note that 
the tariff has two distinct effects on this output decision:  (1)the direct effect on foreign prices; 
and (2)the inferential effect, captured by ( )r t , as the announced tariff rate affects inferences 
made by foreign producers about reserves, and hence world price.  Simplifying (16) yields 
foreign output, foreign price, and trade flows, given tariffs, beliefs and realized reserves: 
 
(17)    ( )( ) ; , ;  ,ty y yA A r t t A A R tt R s mγ γq p M tδ γφ γγ σ γ σ
   + − − + − −= = − ∆   + +    = − + ∆
                                                          
  
6 We consider only a specific tariff.  With an ad valorem tariff there may not be a separating equilibrium; e.g., in our 
model, if A = =0,β 0 , so there is no foreign consumption of y, the optimal ad valorem tariff is independent of R. 
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 where ( )R r t∆ ≡ − , ( )( ); 1s
δ αφα δ β αφ γ≡ ≡+ − σ+  and M is as defined earlier. The term 
[ ]0,α ∈ 1  reflects the fraction of the slope of the export supply curve that is due to the price 
responsiveness of production.  From (17) we see that, ceteris paribus, forecasts of lower reserves 
lead to more foreign output and hence –due to this increased output - a lower world price. By 
comparing (17) to equation (7), we see that equilibrium imports for this case differ from the full 
information case only by the term ( )γ∆  on the right hand side of (17).  Thus, in a separating 
equilibrium imports, as a function of t, will be the same as under full information (though actual 
imports will differ if the tariff differs). Note that the responsiveness of exports (imports) to the 
tariff, as viewed by the importing nation, will differ from the perfect foresight case if the 
government believes that the foreign producers’ forecast of R depends on the tariff rate. 
Finally, substituting all the preceding into the US’ indirect utility function gives US 
utility as a function of actual reserves, the tariff rate, and the belief function: 
 
(18) ( )2( ) 2x y y yV t e p R tm A pγ γ= + + + −  ; y yp p t= +       
 
where ( ,y ym p )  are given in (17).  This expression differs from the full information case only in 
that prices and imports depend upon ∆ , the forecasting error made by producers.  In a separating 
equilibrium (that is, when there is no forecasting error) realized prices, quantity and hence utility 
will be the same as under full information if the tariff is the same. 
Rewriting (18) as a function of the tariff t, the foreign output level yq , and reserves R, we 
obtain the following expression for the indirect utility of a representative domestic agent7 
(19) 
22 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9( , , )y y y yV R q t b b R b q b t b R b q b t b Rq b Rt b q= + + + + + + + + + yt . 
 The US government’s problem of setting trade policy is a dynamic game where foreign 
producers maximize expected profits and the US government’s objective function is given by 
(19). In this game, the importing nation of any type wants to persuade foreign producers that it 
has low reserves. Since, under full information the tariff rate is inversely related to the level of 
reserves, a high tariff may signal a low level of reserves. If the US government with relatively 
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low reserves sets the same tariff rate as under full information, then types with larger reserves 
may want to mimic the low reserve government’s behavior. Thus, to separate from these types 
the low reserve type may want to increase its tariff above the full information level (thus making 
imitation more costly). In other words, we intuitively expect that, similarly to Collie and Hviid 
(1994), a fully separating equilibrium might exist in which tariffs are monotonically declining in 
reserves and tariff levels are, in general, higher than in the full information setting. To support 
our intuition we solve for the sequential equilibrium of our game, which is defined as follows. 
 
Definition: A sequential equilibrium consists of strategies t R  and ( ) ( )yq t  and beliefs 
8 such 
that: 
( )r t
(i) The importing government chooses t R  to maximize the ex ante indirect utility function ( )
( , ( ), )yV R q t t  for all R; 
(ii) Foreign producers choose output that maximizes their expected profits given beliefs r( )⋅ . 
This output level is given by ( ) ( ){ }( ) ( )yq t A A r t tδ γ γ σ= + − − + ; and 
(iii) Foreign producers’ beliefs ( )r ⋅  on the equilibrium path are determined by Bayes’ rule 
given the prior probability over the importing government’s types and the importing 
government’s equilibrium strategy t R . ( )
 
Let  denote the indirect utility of the representative domestic agent when the 
domestic government’s true type is R, foreign producers’ inference about its type is r and tariff t 
is chosen. Substituting the expression for 
( , , )V R r t
( )yq t  into ( , ( ), )yq t tV R it is easy to verify that9 
 
(20) . V R r t a a R a r a t a R a r a t a Rr a Rt a rt( , , ) = + + + + + + + + +0 1 2 3 4 2 5 2 6 2 7 8 9
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
Let  denote the optimal tariff when foreign producers are completely informed 
about domestic reserves and the domestic government can precommit to its trade policy 
t R∗ ( )
 
0 9,...,b7 The definitions of parameters b  are given in Appendix 2. 
8 r( ) is a probability distribution over [ ] . R R,
9 The definition of parameters  in equation (20) are given in Appendix 2. 0 ,...,a a9
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instrument. From Section 2, we have that ( ) ( )( ) 2t R M R σ φ∗  = −  . In Appendix 1 we prove 
the following lemma10. 
t R t R( ) ( )= ∗
 
Lemma1:  In any separating equilibrium of the game, . 
 
 The intuition behind the lemma is straightforward. The worst beliefs, from the US 
government’s perspective, that foreign producers may have about US reserves, both on and off 
the equilibrium path, is given by R . Hence, a deviation from )(Rt ∗  cannot be credibly punished.  
 Mailath (1987) has identified conditions on the signaling parties’ utility function that 
ensure uniqueness of the separating equilibrium.  Using his results, the proof of the following 
proposition is found in Appendix 1: 
 
Proposition 1: Suppose that the equilibrium triplet ( )t q ry( ), ( ), ( )⋅ ⋅ ⋅  is fully separating, and 
suppose that the initial value condition t R t R( ) ( )= ∗  holds (Lemma 1). Then 
(i) t R( )  is continuous and strictly decreasing on [ ]R R, . It is differentiable on (R R, )  and 
satisfies the differential equation 
(21) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
1 1 1
( ) ( ) 21 2
A R A t M tdt
dR M tA R A t
φ φ γ φ γδ δ
γ β γ γ β γ σ φφ φ σ φ
   − − − + − + −   = =        + +− − − − −     
φ
− − .  
 
(ii) The solution to the differential equation (21) coupled with the initial value condition 
t R t R( ) ( )= ∗ is unique. 
 
Thus, the signaling game has a unique separating equilibrium given by (21) together with the 
initial value condition t R t R( ) ( )= ∗ . Although t R( )  is the unique separating equilibrium it is not 
the unique sequential equilibrium of the signaling game, as the game also has pooling equilibria 
where some types pool at the same tariff rate. However, only the unique separating equilibrium 
survives the universal divinity criterion of Banks and Sobel (1987). The universal divinity 
criterion applied to our game implies that if the foreign producers observe out-of-equilibrium 
                                                          
10 All proofs are given in Appendix 1. 
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tariff rates their posterior beliefs place positive probability only on types that are most likely to 
deviate from the equilibrium. The proof that the unique sequential equilibrium satisfying the 
universal divinity criterion is separating is similar to the proof of a similar result in the game of 
investment and rate regulation in Besanko and Spulber (1992). For this reason, we omit details of 
the proof and only outline its structure. As a first step in the proof, one can show that the tariff 
schedule t R( ) is non-increasing in R for any sequential equilibrium satisfying the universal 
divinity criterion. Using this result, we can demonstrate that at any sequential equilibrium 
satisfying the universal divinity criterion, the foreign exporters put probability one on the type 
R R=  for off-the-equilibrium path tariff rates t t . Also, for off-the-equilibrium path tariff 
rates 
R< ( )
t t> R( ) , the foreign exporters assess probability one to the event R R= . Finally, these 
results can be used to prove that the unique sequential equilibrium satisfying universal divinity 
criterion is fully separating. 
The following proposition verifies our intuition on the relationship between the tariffs under 
full and incomplete information. Proof is provided in Appendix 1. 
 
Proposition 2: The tariff t R( )
R( )
 in the unique separating equilibrium is strictly greater than the 
full-information tariff t  for all ∗ [ )R R R∈ , . 
 
Equilibrium tariffs are higher under asymmetric information since the government has an 
incentive to misrepresent its type.  The more price-responsive is foreign output, the greater is the 
government’s incentive to misrepresent its type. The higher tariff implies that both importing and 
exporting nations are worse off than under full information.  Thus, the signaling equilibrium is 
Pareto inferior to the full information equilibrium and hence to the quota. 
 
Corollary:  In the asymmetric information game described here, all parties prefer quotas to 
tariffs.  
 
The result that tariffs are higher in the signaling equilibrium is similar, in spirit and 
intuition, to the problem that arises with an inability to commit to tariffs.  In the latter case, 
governments have an incentive to revise tariffs after production decisions are made; since foreign 
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producers anticipate this, they reduce output, leading to an equilibrium that is Pareto inferior to 
the commitment equilibrium.  
From the preceding it is not clear how the importing nation is affected by knowing its 
true reserves before choosing its tariff  – i.e., how from an ex ante perspective expected welfare 
in the case of asymmetric information compares to that under uncertainty.  Clearly, when a quota 
is used, expected welfare under asymmetric information is higher than under uncertainty since 
the quota equilibrium replicates the full information equilibrium.  
In general, the equilibrium signaling tariff is non-linear and expected utility for the two 
cases is not readily compared.  However, for the special case in which the smallest tariff is zero 
( )( 0fit R = ) , the tariff under signaling is linear in reserves.  For this case the tariff rules are11: 
(22) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 12 2fi u e si fit M R ; t M R ; t t ;σ φ σ φ ϖ= − = − =  
 ( ) ( )21 1 1 4 2 ;ϖ ξ ξ ξϑ  = + + + + >     1 ( ) ( )( )1 1ξ α φ αφ≡ − − ; ( ) ( )( )22 1ϑ φ φ φ= − −  
 
where the superscripts refer to full information, uncertainty, and the signaling equilibrium, 
respectively.  For this case realized welfare under the signaling equilibrium is given by: 
(23) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (( ) ( ) )
2 2
1 1* 1 2
2 2x
R A A RM R M
V R e
2
φ ϖ ϖ
γ γ σ γ σ φ φ
+ −+ −= + + ++ +
−
−  
Clearly, ( ) ( ) ( ){ },fi u siE V Max E V E V> ;comparing ( )uE V and ( )siE V yields, after simplification:   
(24) 
( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
22 22
1 1 1
2
1 2 1 1
2 2 2 2
e
si u
M
E V V Var R
φ φ ϖ ϖ φ ϖδ β φ γ β
σ φ σ φγ β
  − − − −+ +   − = + −    − −+   
  
                                                          
11Let the equilibrium tariff under signaling be: ( ) ( )sit M M tµ= fi fit, where  is the full information tariff.  In 
general, ( )Mµ is given by: ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) )(( )( ) ( )121 11 1 2M M Mπϖ µ −− − =πϖ µ ϖ− − ϖ .    1, 2ϖ ϖ  are 
the roots of:  and ( )(x x− + )1 ξ ξϑ− =2 0, ,ξ ϑ are defined in (22); thus, 1 21, 0ϖ ϖ> < .  M is the value of 
M at the highest level of reserves  ( ) ( )( )1M A R Aφ φ≡ − − − ,  and ( ) ( )( ) [ ]2 1ϖ≡ − 21 0∈ ,1π ϖ ϖ− . 
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where 1 1ϖ >  since tariffs are higher under the signaling equilibrium than under full information. 
If  1ϖ  is close to one (α  close to zero) and/or the Var(R) is large relative to the expected value 
of M, then the signaling equilibrium will yield higher expected utility than the case of uncertainty 
since the costs due to signaling will be relatively low. However, in other cases the signaling 
equilibrium yields lower expected utility for the informed agent, implying that the information 
concerning reserves has a negative (expected) value for the policy-active importing nation. 
 Finally, note that the country may be worse off in the signaling equilibrium than under 
free trade – as can also happen if commitment is not feasible.  Realized home welfare under free 
trade is given by (23), with 1 0.   Thus: ϖ =
Proposition 3. If 1 2ϖ >  the signaling equilibrium leads to lower welfare than free trade12. 
  
5. Time-consistency of Trade Policy and Forward Contracts 
 In this section we study what happens if the US government cannot irrevocably commit 
its trade policy before production decisions are made.  We consider only two informational 
environments: the full information case and the case in which the US government has superior 
information. It is well known (see Lapan (1988a), Maskin and Newberry (1990)) that in the full 
information case both the importing and exporting countries are worse off due to this inability to 
precommit to announced trade policy. In particular, if the US government can revise its 
announced policy after foreign producers have made their production decisions and before the 
consumption and trade decisions have been made, the ex ante optimal tariff (derived in Section 
2) is not time-consistent. The time-consistent solution (i.e., when foreign producers’ forecast of 
the future tariff rate is correct) entails a lower level of imports and a higher tariff rate than in the 
case when the policy-active government can precommit. On the other hand, under asymmetric 
information the ability of the importing government to revise its announced trade policy after 
production decisions may benefit both the importing and the exporting nations13.  
                                                          
12 1 2ϖ ≥  implies: ( ) ( 22 1 2α φ φ≥ − − .  For example, if the slope of the domestic import demand 
schedules equals the slope of the foreign export supply schedule ( ).5φ = ,  then ( )4 7α ≥  suffices.  
)
13 If the domestic government cannot precommit to its tariff before production decisions are made and if it does  not 
have any other policy instruments (e.g., production or consumption taxes and/or subsidies) and cannot offer forward 
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In what follows we assume that the policy-active government sets its final tariff after 
foreign exporters’ production decisions. Lapan (1988b) demonstrates, under complete 
information, that if the policy-active government can use forward contracts an ex ante optimal 
solution can be restored. It is interesting to consider the role of forward contracts when the 
trading parties are asymmetrically informed. In this case, forward contracts have an additional 
role of serving as a signal to foreign producers. For this reason, we consider the following 
sequence of decisions to investigate the role of forward contracts as signaling devices.  
 
Stage 1:  The level of US reserves R is learned by the government but is not revealed to foreign    
 agents. 
Stage 2: The US government decides on the number of forward contracts to be bought forward. 
Stage 3:  Foreign producers make production decisions based upon their prior beliefs concerning  
 R and the actual number of contracts purchased forward. 
Stage 4: The US government sets its tariff. 
Stage 5: The true value of R is revealed to all agents. 
Stage 6: Trade and consumption decisions are made and implemented. 
 
 Let F denote the number of forward contracts bought by the US government and let Fyp  
denote the price specified in the contracts. The government’s choice of the number of forward 
contracts  is a function of its private information R. After observing F foreign producers 
make an inference about the true level of R. We let r(F) denote the updated beliefs of foreign 
producers about US reserves. Similarly to the previous section, we solve the game backward. 
( )F R
Domestic per capita income is given by 
 
(25) ( ) ( )Fx y y y y y yI e p R p p m p p F= + + − + − . 
Note that in any separating equilibrium of the game the forward price Fyp  is equal to the 
spot price yp . Otherwise, one of the trading parties would be unwilling  to trade forward. Given 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
contracts, the ex post tariff is given by t , where “d” is 
defined below equation (30). It can be verified that under many parameterizations the domestic government prefers 
to set its tariff after production decisions are made. 
[ ]




+−+−−+=
eeC RRdAA
d
RR γβ
γδ
γβγδβ 22)(
1),(
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the predetermined output levels, the tariff, and the realized value of R, foreign prices are given 
by (11): ( ), yty A A R q tp t R γγ β
+ − − −= + .  Substituting this expression into the US’ utility function 
and optimizing over the tariff rate we get the ex post optimal tariff rate as a function of contracts 
traded forward, the actual reserves and the foreign producers’ output:  
 
(26) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2yt A R A q F )β γ β γ β β = − − − − + + γ  
 
When foreign producers make their output decision they use their forecast of the future 
tariff and foreign price  
 
(27) ( () ){ }( )y yq A A r F q tδ γ γ β= + − − − +        
 
where t is the tariff rate in (26). Solving (27) for yq  we obtain  
 
(28) ( ) ( ){ }( ( )) ( ) ( 2 ) ( )yq A r F A Fδ β β γ γ β β γ δ β= − + + + + + +γ  
 
 Similarly to the tariff in the preceding section, forward contracts have two effects on the 
production decisions of foreign exporters, the direct and the inferential effects. Substituting (28) 
into (26) we obtain the ex post optimal tariff as a function of the domestic government’s true 
type R, foreign producers’ beliefs r and the number of forward contracts, F: 
 
(29) 1 ( 2 ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( 2 ) ( ) 2 2
R r F Aβ β γ δ β γ δγβ δ γ β γ δβ β γ δ β γ β γ β γ
 + + += + − − − − + + + + + t A
 F+ +
 
When performing the above manipulations we implicitly assumed that the US government 
knows foreign producers’ beliefs, foreign producers know that the US government knows, and so 
on ad infinitum. As is well known, any sequential equilibrium should satisfy this requirement.   
Finally, substituting all the preceding into the US’ indirect utility function gives US 
utility as a function of actual reserves, the number of forward contracts, and the belief function: 
 
(30) , V R r F c c R c r c F c R c r c F c Rr c RF c rF( , , ) = + + + + + + + + +0 1 2 3 4 2 5 2 6 2 7 8 9
 where d ≡ + + +β β γ δ β γ( ) (2 ) 9c, and the parameters  are defined in Appendix 2. 0 ,...,c
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 The strategic interaction between the US government and the foreign producers is a 
signaling game, where the foreign producers’ output rule, given the beliefs, is given by (28) and 
the US government maximizes the indirect utility function of its representative agent. As in the 
preceding section, the US government wants to convince foreign producers that it has low 
reserves. Under full information, the number of forward contracts  offered by the US 
government is given by 
F R∗ ( )
( )(( ) (2 )F R M R )α φ∗ = − . The resulting tariff rate and the welfare of 
importing and exporting nations are the same as in the full information case of Section 2.  Note 
also that the number of forward contracts is inversely related to the level of reserves. Thus, a 
large number of forward contracts may signal a low level of reserves.  
 We want to investigate whether in the asymmetric information setting a separating 
equilibrium exists and how it is related to the full information forward contracts and tariff. It is 
straightforward to verify that the indirect utility function in (30) satisfies properties (1)-(5) from 
Mailath (1987). However, it does not satisfy the single-crossing property. More precisely, 
( ) ( ) ( )V r V F β γ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = −   which is invariant to changes in R. Moreover, the initial value 
condition )()( RFRF ∗=  is not satisfied. The solution to the differential equation14 
( ) ( )dF dR β γ= , given the initial value condition, is not an equilibrium since type R  has an 
incentive to deviate from its strategy. Thus, the results from Mailath (1987) do not apply to this 
case. The separating equilibrium of the game is found by differentiating15 (30) with respect to F 
and equating the derivative to 0. The resulting equation has two solutions. The first is the 
solution ( ) (dF dR )β γ= , but the second-order conditions are not satisfied at this solution. The 
second solution is the full information level of forward contracts . It is straightforward to 
verify that this strategy constitutes a part of a sequential equilibrium. Substituting for F in (29) 
one can easily verify the optimal tariff is equal to the optimal tariff under full information 
(equation (9) in Section 2). Thus, when the US government can purchase forward and has an 
ability to revise its tariff after production decisions are made, the unique separating equilibrium 
outcome is the same as under full information (Section 2). 
F R∗ ( )
                                                          
14 The solution to this differential equation when the initial value condition is satisfied is given by 
[ ]
F R
A A d
R( )
( )= + +
+ −
+ −





 +
1
2β γ δ
δ β δ γ
β δ γ
β
γ R , which is the same as under complete information. 
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Proposition 4. Under asymmetric information and assuming the policy active government cannot 
precommit to its tariff, the use of forward contracts leads to a sequential equilibrium that 
replicates the full information commitment equilibrium. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 It is a fundamental premise of international negotiations that tariffs are superior to quotas 
as trade restrictions.   One reason for this belief is that tariffs are thought to be more transparent. 
We have shown that, in the context of asymmetric information, tariffs are inferior to quotas.  The 
informational content of tariffs induces governments with private information to use higher 
tariffs in order to signal their type.  The resulting tariff equilibrium is more restrictive than the 
quota equilibrium since, with quotas, foreign exporters do not care about the type of the foreign 
government, once trade volumes are known.  Since the quota’s signaling role is unimportant, it 
can support the full information equilibrium.  We have also seen that, with tariffs and 
asymmetric information, the inability to precommit tariffs does not necessarily lower welfare.  In 
fact, we have shown that – as in the full information case – the use of forward contracts with the 
dynamically consistent tariff supports the full information commitment equilibrium. 
 Our results are somewhat analogous to the old literature on the relative ability of tariffs 
and quotas to protect countries from domestic, or foreign, disturbances.  In our paper, since the 
“disturbance” (i.e., the private information) is internal, the quota effectively isolates foreign 
countries from this disturbance, and therefore the signaling aspect of the quota is unimportant to 
foreigners.  Naturally, this raises the question of how these instruments compare when the 
private information possessed by the US government concerns foreign disturbances.    
 A final question that occurs is how the presence of asymmetric information affects the 
conclusion that tariff negotiations can, in conjunction with market access commitments, lead to 
efficient outcomes that do not require contracting on domestic policy (as, for example, in 
Bagwell and Staiger (2001)).  Since market access commitments, like quotas, are (implicit) 
contracts on trade volumes, the combination of tariff and quantitative commitments, which are 
used to avoid contracting on domestic policies, may have to be rethought in situations with 
asymmetric information.     
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15 Note that that foreign producers’ beliefs r are a function of forward contracts F. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose that t R  is the equilibrium strategy of type-t R( ) ( )≠ ∗ R  
government. The equilibrium payoff is given by V R . Consider a deviation of the 
government to a strategy 
R t R( , , ( ))
t R∗ ( ) . The payoff for this strategy is given by 
( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
[ ] ( ) ( )
V R r t R t R a a R a r t R a t R a R a r t R
a t R a Rr t R a Rt R a r t R t R
, ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
= + + + + +
+ + + +
0 1 2 3 4
2
5
2
6
2
7 8 9                                   
∗
 
In what follows we replace ( )r t R∗ ( ) by r  to simplify our notation. Thus, the gain to this 
deviation is given by 
 [ ]
[ ]{ }
∆ = + + + + + +
− + + + + + +
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗a r a r a r R a t R a Rt R a rt R a t R
a R a R a R a t R a Rt R a Rt R a t R
2 5
2
7 3 8 9 6
2
2 5
2
7
2
3 8 9 6
2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )       
 
 
First, note that:  
 { }
[ ]{ }
{ } 0))((
))((
))((2
)(2)()()(2
))((
)(
2
7
2
527
2
52
≥−−++++
−+−≥
++−+−−+++++
−−=
++−++
ARARr
RRrAARr
RaRaRaRrarara
γδβδγβγβ
γβδ
δγββδγγδβγβδγβγβ
δ  
 
Thus, to prove that deviation is profitable it suffices to show that: 
[ ] [ ]{ }
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RtRtaRtRtRaaa
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δγβδβγδβδγβ
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where the last inequality follows from the fact  is the unique maximizer of t R∗ ( )
[ ]γβ γ δ β δ γ β δ β γ δ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )+ + + − − − + + + 2 222A R A t t .   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: We use Theorem 2 and the corollary from Mailath (1987) to prove this 
proposition. For this purpose we only need to check that the assumptions used in these results 
hold (these assumptions correspond to conditions (1) – (5) in Mailath (1987)).  
(1) V R r t( , , )  is  a polynomial and, hence, twice continuously differentiable in its arguments; 
(2) Belief monotonicity: 
∂
∂
V
r
a a r a R a t= + + + <2 5 7 92 0  
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(3) Type monotonicity: 
∂
∂ ∂
2
8
20
V
t R
a for all R r t R R R= < ∈ × +( , , ) [ , ]  
Note that the function V R r t( , , )  is strictly concave in t 
∂
∂
2
2 6
20
V
t
a for all R r t R R= < ∈ ( , , ) [ , ] R×

+  and, hence, conditions of “strict” 
quasiconcavity (condition (4)) and boundedness (condition (5)) hold.   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: We know that 
dt R
dR
( ) < 0  and ∂ ∂
V R R t R
r
( , , ( )) < 0 . These two conditions 
imply that 
∂
∂
V R R t R
t
l l R l t R
( , , ( ))
( )= + + <0 1 2 0 . Rearranging this equation yields 
t R
A R A
t R( )
( )( )
( )( )
( )> + − −+ + + =
∗β δ γ
β δ β γ δ2  for all [ )R R R∈ , .   Q.E.D. 
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Appendix 2:  Parameters definition 
Parameter definitions for equation (20): 
 
2 2
0 2
( ) ( )
2 ( ) 2( )x
A A A A A Ab e γγ β γ β γ
+ += + − ++ + ; 1 2
(2 )
( )
A Ab β γ ββ γ
+ += + ; 2 2( )
A Ab β γβ γ
−= + ; 
3 2( )
A A
b
γ β γ
β γ
 − = + ; 4 2
2
2( )
b β γβ γ
+= − + ; 5 22( )b
γ
β γ= + ; 
[ ]
6 2
2
2( )
b
βγ β γ
β γ
+= − + ;  
7 2( )
b ββ γ= − + ; 8 2( )b
βγ
β γ= − + ; 
2
9 2( )
b γβ γ= + . 
 
Parameter definitions, equation (21) 
 
( )2
0
( )((1 ) 1
2 2( )x
A A A AAa e
φ φ
γ σ γ
+ + − −= + − +
)
; 1
( )
( )( )
A Aa β γ σ ββ γ σ γ
+ + += + + ;  
( )
2
1
( )( )
A A
a
δ φ φ
β γ σ γ
 − − = − + + ; 
( )
3
1
( )
A A
a
γ φ φ
σ γ
 − − = + ; 4 2
2
2( )
a β γβ γ
+= − + ; 
( ) 2
5 2
1
2( ) ( )
a
φ δ
β γ σ γ
−= + + ; 6
(2 )
2
a γφ φ−= − ;  
7 2( ) (
a
)
βδ
β γ σ γ= + + ; 
( )
8
1
( )
a
β φ
β γ
−= − + ; 
( )2
9
1
( )
a
φ δ
β γ
−= − + . 
 
Parameter definitions, equation (30) 
 
[ ] [ ][ ]c e A d A A d A A A Ax0
2
2
2
22 2
2 2= + + + − − + + + + −γ
β β δ γ βγ β δ β β γ δ γ( ) ( ) ( ) ; 
c
A A
d1
2= + +( )β δ β ; [ ]c ; A A
d2 2
= − + −βδ β δ γ( ) [ ]c A A
d3 2
= + −γδ β δ γ( ) ; 
c4
1
2
= − +( )β γ ; c ; d5
2
22 2
= +
βγδ
β γ( ) c d6 2
2
2
= − + + +γ β δ β γ δ( )( ) ; c
d7 2
= +
βδ
β γ( ) ; 
c
d8
= − +β δ ; c
d9 2
2= + + +β β δ β γ δ( )( ) . 
 24
 25
References 
Bagwell, K. and Staiger, R. W. (2001). “Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and 
International Economic Institutions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 116, No. 2, 
pp. 519-562. 
Banks, J.S. and Sobel, J. (1987). “Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games,” Econometrica, 
Vol. 55, pp. 647-661. 
Besanko, D. and Spulber, D.F. (1992). “Sequential-equilibrium Investment by Regulated Firms,” 
RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 153-170. 
Collie, D. and Hviid, M. (1994). “Tariffs for a Foreign Monopolist under Incomplete 
Information,” Journal of International Economics 37, pp. 249-264. 
 
Lapan, H.E. (1998a). “The Optimal Tariff, Production Lags, and Time Consistency.” American 
Economic Review 78: 395-401. 
 
Lapan, H.E. (1988b). “The Optimal Tariff, Production Lags, and Time Consistency.”  Working 
Paper, Iowa State University. 
Mailath, G. (1987). “Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types,” 
Econometrica, Vol. 55, No. 6, pp. 1349-1365. 
Maskin, E. and Newbery, D. (1990). “Disadvantageous Oil Tariffs and Dynamic Consistency.” 
American Economic Review 80: 143-156. 
 
 
